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conducted in the 2005 congressional election in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Combining 
different regression models and matching methods, we estimate the effect of alternative 
voting technologies on the probability of support for the competing parties in the elections 
for congress and state legislature. The results of the different statistical techniques indicate 
that voters are extremely receptive to the information cues provided by the different voting 
technologies and associated ballot designs, and that particular voting devices have a 
significant impact on voter choice, systematically favoring some parties to the detriment of 
others. We conclude that the choice of alternative electronic voting devices might have 
considerable effect on electoral outcomes in multi-party electoral systems. 
 
*Gabriel Katz, Graduate student, California Institute of Technology, gabriel@hss.caltech.edu, 
corresponding author; R. Michael Alvarez, Professor of Political Science, California Institute of 
Technology; Ernesto Calvo, Associate Professor, University of Houston; Marcelo Escolar, Professor, 
Universidad de Buenos Aires; Graduate student, London School of Economics. 
 1
1. Introduction 
An increasing number of countries around the world have adopted electronic voting 
systems in national and local elections since the 1990s, and many others are conducting pilot 
projects (Milkota, 2002; Alvarez and Hall, 2004, 2005, 2008). While the academic literature 
has focused mainly on the reliability and accuracy of different electronic voting technologies 
(Alvarez et al., 2001; Alvarez and Hall, 2004, 2008; Stewart, 2004; Ansolabehere and 
Stewart, 2005) only a few empirical studies have directly examined the effect of different 
voting technologies on election outcomes (Wand, 2004; Card and Moretti, 2007; Herron and 
Wand, 2007; Herron, Mebane and Wand, 2008). Empirical studies have even been fewer in 
multiparty electoral systems, where with a larger number of parties and candidates on a 
ballot, voters might be more responsive to readily available information and thus may resort 
to different cues in order to identify and distinguish the various electoral options and to 
select their preferred choice (Conover and Feldman, 1989; Reynolds and Steenbergen, 
2006).  
In this paper, we analyze how different voting technologies influence voters’ choice and 
election outcomes in multiparty races, examining evidence from a voting pilot conducted in 
the 2005 congressional election in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in which four e-vote prototypes 
were tested. Combining alternative regression models and non-parametric matching methods 
in order to assess the robustness of our results and strengthen the validity of our conclusions, 
we show that voters alter their electoral behavior and their vote choice in response to 
different e-vote technologies, and that this might translate into different electoral outcomes 
across voting devices. Our main findings are in line with the results of Calvo, Escolar and 
Pomares (2007), in the sense that ‘technology matters’, and that different voting 
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technologies and associated ballot designs might have substantive effects on election results 
in multi-party electoral systems.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
literature on the impact of voting technologies on electoral outcomes. Section 3 describes 
the Buenos Aires pilot project. Section 4 presents preliminary descriptive evidence on the 
effect of the different voting technologies considered on voters’ electoral behavior. In 
Section 5, we describe the data and the different methodologies used to assess the effect of 
the voting technologies on voter choice and electoral outcomes. Section 6 presents and 
comments the main empirical results, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The effect of electronic voting technologies on electoral outcomes 
Previous research has underscored several ways in which different electronic voting 
technologies could favor some parties or candidates over others, thus influencing election 
results. One possibility that has received much public attention and media coverage, 
particularly in the aftermath of the 2000 U.S. presidential election, is whether certain 
devices are more vulnerable to illegal manipulation and vote tampering (Stewart, 2004; Card 
and Moretti, 2007; Herron and Wand, 2007), raising the possibility of electoral fraud.  Also, 
there has been some recent work, especially that focused on Florida’s 13th Congressional 
district race in 2006, that studies how ballots are formatted and displayed for voters, and 
whether this influences how ballots are cast (e.g., Frisina et al. 2008).  Finally, the adoption 
of electronic voting devices might have a differential effect on turnout rates among different 
socio-demographic segments of the population, because certain groups might find computers 
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more intimidating or confusing than others (Tomz and Van Houweling, 2003; Moretti and 
Card, 2007).  
Thus, previous work indicates that characteristics and features of voting devices may 
influence voters’ electoral choices. Voting systems differ in many ways, for example their 
ballot design, in the information and contents presented to the voters, and in the possibility 
of changing or correcting a vote (Herrnson et al., 2008). If the characteristics of specific 
voting technologies disproportionately affect the likelihood of making mistakes and casting 
spoiled ballots among groups of voters who share a partisan propensity, then the potential 
bias in recorded votes relative to intended votes exhibited by different voting technologies 
might substantially affecting election outcomes (Sinclair and Alvarez, 2004; Herrnson et al., 
2006; Herrnson et al., 2008). A related concern regarding the design of voting devices is that 
differences in the amount and the form in which information is presented to voters might 
affect the cues they use to identify and select the candidates (Herron, Mebane and Wand, 
2008). Voting devices that require well-informed voters or that provide different information 
shortcuts for decision-making might favor some parties to the detriment of others, 
potentially affecting election results. This is particularly relevant in multiparty elections that 
impose higher information demands on voters and increase the potential influence of design 
effects on voters’ electoral choice (Reynolds and Steenbergen, 2006).  
Empirical evidence regarding the question of whether and to what extent  different voting 
technologies actually affect election results is far from conclusive (Card and Moretti, 2007; 
Herron and Wand, 2007; Frisina et al., 2008; Herron, Mebane and Wand, 2008). All these 
studies, however, have analyzed U.S. elections, where the number of competing candidates 
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is limited compared to multi-party electoral systems, and relied on observational data.1 In 
this paper, we use data from a field experiment conducted in the City of Buenos Aires in 
order to test for the impact of ballot design and informational effects on candidate choice 
and election outcomes in multi-party elections. Our experimental setting mitigates concerns 
related to vote tampering, differential turnout rates, endogenous adoption of voting 
technologies (Knack and Kropf, 2002; Saltman, 2006; Herron, Mebane and Wand, 2008) 
and other challenges posed by observational data (Herron and Wand, 2007).   
 
3. The Buenos Aires’ 2005 Pilot Project 
Voters in the congressional election held in Buenos Aires in October 2005 elected 
national representatives and state legislators using a party-list paper ballot system that 
included candidates for all offices.2 Seats were allocated using a PR-D’Hont formula with 
closed party lists of magnitude 13 for representatives and 30 for legislators. Thirty parties 
presented candidate lists for national representatives, while forty one parties presented lists 
for the state legislature. Three parties captured approximately 66% of the valid votes in the 
election of national representatives and 64% in the election of state legislators: President 
Kirchner’s Frente para la Victoria (FPV), the center-left opposition party Alianza para una 
                                                 
1 This is the case of most research on the effect of voting technologies. Important exceptions are 
Herrnson et al. (2006; 2008) and Sinclair et al. (2000); none of these studies, however, are centered 
on the impact of design effects on the support for different candidates or parties. 
2 The description of the e-vote pilot borrows from Calvo, Escolar and Pomares (2007). See also 
Alvarez (2005), and the reference materials at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Elections2005/05.htm 
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Republica de Iguales (ARI), and the center-right Propuesta Republicana (PRO).3 None of 
the remaining parties obtained more than 5% of the vote in either of the two congressional 
races (Ministry of Interior of Argentina, 2008). The campaign for national representatives 
was very intense, with high spending in support of the candidacies of Rafael Bielsa (FPV), 
Elisa Carrio (ARI), and Mauricio Macri (PRO). By contrast, candidates to the local 
legislature spent almost no money during the campaign (Calvo, Escolar and Pomares, 2007). 
The e-pilot was conducted in 41 precincts randomly distributed throughout the city and 
included 14,800 participants. After voting in the official election, participants in each 
precinct were asked to participate in a non-binding election in which they were randomly 
assigned to one of four possible voting devices and were asked to vote a list of national 
deputies and a list of local legislators. Because the experiment was carried out in a single 
electoral district, with participants in each precinct being randomly assigned to the different 
voting devices and facing similar menus of party choices, we expect no correlation between 
the characteristics of the district or the election and voters’ behavior.4  
After the vote, participants in the experiment were asked to complete two surveys. The 
first survey was a short self-administered survey (six questions) conducted with 13,830 
respondents. Half of the questions were identical across prototypes, dealing with general 
                                                 
3 If blank ballots are excluded, the vote share of these three parties comes close to 70%.  
4 Organizational problems prevented the testing of all the protoypes in all the precincts, as originally 
planned (Alvarez, 2005). While Prototypes 1 and 2 were tested in all the precincts, Prototype 3 was 
tested in 40 precincts, and Prototype 4 in only 17 precincts. Even though we do not expect this to 
have resulted in serious imbalance between groups of participants assigned to the different 
prototypes, we take this potential problem into account in the empirical analysis below. 
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perceptions about their e-vote experience. The remaining questions tested usability issues 
specific to each device. A fourth of the participants also answered a longer exit poll. This 
survey further investigated the opinions and attitudes towards electronic voting and its 
alternative, hand-counted paper ballots. The survey also provided information about the 
voters’ political sophistication, their familiarity with technology, and their patterns of 
political participation. It is worth mentioning that, while the vote in the experiment was non-
binding and the election results did not count as such, survey responses showed that voters 
were concerned that the results would be "used" as an exit poll, suggesting that there were 
incentives to choose the same option in the experiment as in the real election.  
The four voting devices tested in the pilot were developed with the existing institutional 
process of Argentina in mind.5 Prototype 1 was a direct recording electronic (DRE) design 
with two separate modules. A screen in the first module allowed voters to review the lists of 
candidates, and a numerical keypad was used to register the vote. Prototype 2 was a touch-
screen DRE machine with a voter verifiable paper trail. Voters could scroll and select party 
lists directly by tapping onto the screen, and vote information was digitally stored in the 
machine, which produced a paper trial to comply with Argentine electoral laws. Prototype 3 
was an optical scan (OS) prototype located inside a voting booth, providing a higher degree 
of privacy. The voter introduced the paper ballot into a rolling scanner that displayed the 
selected party on the prototype’s screen, and would then proceed to confirm her selection. 
                                                 
5 Several provinces in Argentina have tested e-voting systems and adapted their legislation to allow 
for its potential introduction. In Tucuman, Argentina’s smallest province, electronic voting was 
introduced in 2005, and is currently the only voting system used for its provincial elections. 
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This prototype required separate ballots for each race, allowing direct comparison of the 
marks that identify a party across races. Finally, Prototype 4 was an optical scan device with 
a single ballot listing all parties’ names and their numbers. The voter marked her preferences 
for each race with a pencil and then introduced the ballot into a scanner located next to the 
election desk. All four prototypes asked the voter to confirm her choices at the end of the 
process, preventing over and under-counts. Also, in all prototypes, participants voted for 
National Representatives first and State Legislators second.  
An important difference between the DRE and OS prototypes was the way in which 
voters were required to search for their preferred candidates. In the DRE prototypes, party 
labels were randomly rotated on the screen and, because of space restrictions, a limited 
number of labels were displayed on each screen. Two and three screens were required to 
display party labels for national representatives and state legislators in Prototype 1, while 
three and four screens were required in Prototype 2. The placement of the party labels 
rotated randomly for each voter, preventing order effect biases from favoring the same party. 
In the case of Prototype 3, poll workers sorted the paper ballots numerically.6 According to 
the information obtained from the polling place workers, however, ballots rapidly mixed in 
the voting booth, complicating the search for the voters’ preferred ballots. Finally, in 
Prototype 4, party names where listed by their official list number in increasing order. The 
                                                 
6 When registering the candidates running for a specific election, each party is assigned a different 
list number. Candidates and Parties advertise this number during the campaign, together with the 
party and candidate’s name. 
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non-random ordering of parties may have increased the likelihood of order effects but it also 
facilitated the recognition of the same party across races.  
A second relevant difference among the prototypes was how voters accessed information 
about candidates and parties. The first prototype displayed 15 party names on each screen, 
including the list number and party logo information. In order to view the list of candidates, 
however, the voter needed to enter the three-digit party number. If the voter did not know 
the name of the party, she would need to access each list until finding a recognizable 
candidate name. Prototype 2, on the other hand, displayed the name of the first candidate 
under the party label, together with the number and logo information. The complete list of 
candidates was then displayed on a second navigation level. Parties with prominent first 
candidates (such as the pro-Kirchner Rafael Bielsa from the FPV or Mauricio Macri of the 
center-right PRO) were readily identified by voters.7 However, given that voters could 
recognize without any effort the name of their preferred congressional candidate, very little 
information about the party name or number was recalled when casting their legislative vote. 
Hence, while voters faced fewer problems in recognizing their preferred choice for national 
representative, they could not use such information when choosing state legislators.  
Different information was available to voters using the optical scan systems. Ballot 
papers for Prototype 3 included all the relevant information, such as party name, party logo, 
identification number, and the complete list of candidates for each race. The only difficulty 
in identifying the preferred choice, therefore, was in finding the correct paper ballot. In 
                                                 
7 Bielsa was President Kirchner’s Foreign Relations Minister at that time, while Macri is a famous 
businessman and was the president of one of the most famous soccer teams in Argentina. 
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Prototype 4, a booklet provided voters with all the party information; the ballot introduced 
in the rolling scanner listed only the party name, number and logo. It is also worth 
mentioning that some of the political parties favored the OS prototypes because of their 
closer resemblance to the actual voting mechanism used in Buenos Aires congressional 
election. The main characteristics of the four prototypes tested in the experiment are 
summarized in this paper’s supplementary materials (Appendix I).  
 
4. A first look at the effect of different voting technologies on voter choice  
The survey data lets us examine how voters interacted with each prototype and how the 
different voting technologies and the associated ballot designs affected voters’ electoral 
choice.  Table 1 presents data about which ballot features participants used to identify their 
preferred candidates. Nearly half of the voters cast their ballot based using the party name, 
followed by the name of the first candidate. The party’s name was particularly important for 
those participants using Prototype 4: 53.4% of those using the single-ballot OS device stated 
that they relied on the party name when casting their vote.  In contrast, only 44.3% of 
respondents in Prototype 3 used the party name as an information cue.  Also, the name of 
the first candidate was more relevant for those assigned to Prototype 2, while participants 
using Prototype 1 were less likely to use it as a voting cue, using more frequently the party 
number instead. This is consistent with the characteristics of the ballot designs associated 
with the different prototypes: recall that the name of the first candidate figured prominently 
on the second prototype’s screen, while voters using Prototype 1 could access the 
candidates’ names only after entering each party’s number in the keypad. The p-value for 
the modified Pearson’s chi-square test proposed by Loughin and Scherer (1998) with 5,000 
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bootstrap resampled data sets is 0.07, indicating a significant relationship between the 
information used by respondents as voting cues and the voting technologies.8  
 
Table 1  
How voters found their preferred candidates* 
Information used as 
voting cue 
Prototype 1 
(%) 
Prototype 2 
(%) 
Prototype 3 
(%) 
Prototype 4 
(%) 
All 
prototypes 
(%) 
Party name 51.4 51.0 44.3 53.4 49.4 
First candidate’s name 33.3 50.1 47.1 45.0 44.2 
Party Logo 27.3 30.3 22.4 7.4 25.8 
Party number 35.4 21.0 19.9 28.6 25.3 
Other features 4.1 2.7 7.5 6.4 4.6 
N 879 1,158 858 189 3,084 
* Table entries are the percentage of respondents in each prototype that used each of the ballot 
features to identify their preferred candidates. Since participants could use several of the ballot 
features as voting cues, percentages do not necessarily sum to 100 across rows.  
                                                 
8 Given that respondents could use several of the ballot features in order to identify their preferred 
choice, the assumption of independence among units required by the standard test of independence is 
violated. We implemented Loughin and Scherer’s (1998) bootstrap resampling method based on a 
modified Pearson chi-square statistic in order to test for association between voting cue and 
prototype.    
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Table 2, in turn, reports the percentage of participants who were not able to vote for their 
preferred candidate for each of the prototypes, sorted by education and political information 
levels.9 The survey data indicates that education levels affected the ability of the participants 
to vote for their preferred party: while only 3.8% of voters with college education were 
unable to cast a vote for their preferred option, this figure was almost 2.6 times higher for 
those with high school education or lower. The difference in the proportions between the 
two groups is statistically significant, with a 95% confidence interval of [0.04, 0.08] 
(Newcombe, 1998). Although less educated voters experienced more difficulties using all of 
the prototypes tested, the gap between participants with college education and the rest was 
much smaller for Prototype 2: the sample odds ratios (Agresti, 2002) for the probability of 
not being able to vote for the preferred candidate range from 1.7 for this prototype to 4.7 for 
the Protoype 1, suggesting that the touch-screen DRE device imposed substantially lower 
barriers on less educated voters than the other voting devices. The p-value of Woolf’s (1955) 
test for homogeneity across prototypes is 0.001, indicating that there are considerable 
differences across voting technologies regarding the difficulties experienced by less 
educated participants.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Political information was computed as the average of respondents’ number of correct answers to 
three questions asking them he name of the minister of economy, the minister of education and the 
minister of health.   
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Table 2  
Percentage of voters who could not vote for their preferred candidate  
by education and political information level* 
Variable 
Prototype 1 
(%) 
Prototype 2 
(%) 
Prototype 3 
(%) 
Prototype 4 
(%) 
All 
prototypes 
(%) 
Education      
College 3.0 2.7 6.5 3.6 3.8 
Secondary or lower 12.6 4.5 13.6 12.9 9.8 
N 3,175 3,873 2,743 887 10,678 
Non-response rates 21.4 18.4 28.2 27.5 22.8 
      
Political information      
Null 9.9 3.4 11.4 0.0 7.3 
Low 7.3 4.1 11.7 2.4 6.9 
Medium 1.7 4.3 11.5 7.3 5.7 
High 3.0 3.8 10.5 3.8 5.4 
N 835 1,108 823 185 2,951 
Non-response rates 5.0 4.3 4.1 2.1 4.3 
* Table entries are the percentage of respondents in each prototype that were not able to cast a vote 
for their preferred candidate, among all respondents belonging to each row-category that were 
assigned to that prototype. The data on education levels was taken from the short self-administered 
survey, while the data on political information was obtained from the longer exit poll. 
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When we examine the data by political information levels, again Prototype 2 seems to 
have allowed voters with no or low political information to vote for their preferred choice.  
Prototype 3, in contrast, exhibits the highest rates of reported voting problems for all levels 
of political information. The Cochran-Armitage Trend Test (Agresti, 2002) provides 
evidence of a modestly negative linear relationship between political information and 
reported voting problems (two-sided p-value = 0.1), but this is only statistically significant 
(at the 0.01 level) for Prototype 1. Overall, almost 90% of the voters were able to vote for 
their preferred party, with a rate of success ranging from 93.9% for Prototype 2 to 82.6% for 
Prototype 3; the hypothesis of independence between voting device and reported voting 
difficulties is rejected at the usual confidence levels.10  
The fact that the four prototypes impose different information demands on voters and 
seem to have influenced the cues they used in their decision-making process suggests that 
the voting devices could have had systematic effects on electoral outcomes. For instance, 
parties with more visible candidates may have fared relatively better among voters using 
Prototype 2, and those with more recognizable names/logos might have benefited from the 
ballot design and screen display in the DRE devices. Figure 1 explores this issue further, 
reporting the actual vote-share of ARI, FPV, PRO and Other parties in the election of 
national representatives and state legislators for each prototype.11 
 
 
                                                 
10 Pearsons’ chi-squared test yields 2 50.3χ = , with 3 degrees of freedom. 
11 Vote-shares are expressed as percentages of the total number of votes cast for the competing 
parties in both races, excluding blank and null votes. 
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Figure 1   
Parties’ vote share, by prototype and election 
 
Note: The gray bar indicates parties’ vote-shares in the election of National Representatives; the  
black bar corresponds to to the election of State Legislators. 
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For all the prototypes tested, each of the three largest parties, Alianza para una Republica 
de Iguales (ARI), Frente para la Victoria (FPV) and Propuesta Republicana (PRO), 
exhibited higher vote-shares in the first election, jointly obtaining 65% of the total vote cast 
for the parties competing in the election of national representatives. In contrast, the smallest 
parties gathered almost 50% of the vote in the less visible state legislative race. However, 
there are remarkable variations in the vote-share of the different parties across prototypes. 
First, the vote-share of the smaller parties included in the category “Other” is substantially 
higher in Prototype 3, reaching 48.7% in the national representative election and 55.7% in 
the state legislative election. In contrast, the support for minor parties was the lowest among 
voters using Prototype 4, with 36.4% and 41.6% respectively. Also, the relative support for 
the three largest parties varied across prototypes. The total vote-share of ARI, FPV and PRO 
in the National (Local) election was 21.0% (18.2%), 15.6% (12.6%) and 22.6% (19.9%), 
respectively. However, for both races, ARI fared relatively better among voters using 
Prototype 1, while FPV maximized its vote-share among those using Prototype 4; the 
support for PRO, in contrast, did not vary substantially across voting devices.  
As reported in Table 3, based on Pearson’s chi-squared test statistic, the hypothesis that 
the average proportion of votes obtained by each of the parties under the different prototypes 
is the same is rejected at the 0.9 confidence level in both congressional races. In order to 
analyze the discrepancy in the mean support of the parties across prototypes, we used 
bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (Abadie, 2002; Diamond and Sekhon, 2005; 
Mebane and Sekhon, 2008) to examine the statistical significance of differences in each 
party’s vote-share between pairs of voting devices. The p-values of these pairwise tests, 
based on 10,000 replicates, are also reported in Table 3. The results point to statistically 
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significant differences between Prototype 3 and the two DRE devices regarding the support 
for the three largest parties: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov p values are highly significant for the 
comparisons of FPV and PRO’s vote-shares under Prototypes 1 and 2 and their support 
under Prototype 3 in both races, as well as for the comparison of ARI’s vote-share under 
Prototypes 1 and 3 in the national representative election. In the case of the smaller parties, 
there are statistically significant differences between their support under Prototype 3 and 
each of the remaining prototypes in the two elections analyzed.  
 
Table 3 
Comparison of parties’ vote-shares across prototypes - p-values  of the tests 
 Comparisons across prototypes  ARI FPV PRO Other parties 
      
Equal support across prototypesa 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pairwise comparisonsb     
Prototypes 1-2 0.13 0.87 0.33 0.70 
Prototypes 1-3 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.00 
Prototypes 1-4 0.55 0.69 0.32 0.67 
Prototypes 2-3 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Prototypes 2-4 0.99 0.51 0.54 0.56 
Election of 
National 
Representatives 
Prototypes 3-4 0.42 0.36 0.20 0.01 
      
Equal support across prototypesa 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pairwise comparisonsb     
Prototypes 1-2 0.04 0.51 0.71 0.13 
Prototypes 1-3 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Prototypes 1-4 0.84 0.85 0.12 0.13 
Prototypes 2-3 0.57 0.01 0.06 0.00 
Prototypes 2-4 0.13 0.84 0.25 0.00 
Election of 
State 
Legislators 
Prototypes 3-4 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.00 
a p-values based on Pearson's chi-squared test statistic. 
b p-values of bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests based on 10,000 replicates. 
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5. Estimating the effect of different e-vote technologies on election outcomes  
While the data presented in the previous section reveals some interesting differences in 
voters’ electoral behavior across voting devices, it does not allow us to assess the relative  
impact of the different technologies and ballot designs on the voter choice after accounting 
for the effect of socio-demographic and attitudinal variables. Controlling for these predictors  
might be relevant in order to estimate the causal effect of the prototypes on voters’ choice 
and election outcomes (Gelman and Hill, 2007), given that not all of the four prototypes 
were used in all the districts analyzed.12  
As our data includes the individual level votes for all the participants in the e-vote pilot 
who were randomly assigned to the different prototypes, we can analyze the aggregate 
electoral and survey data from voting stations defined by crossing each of the precincts with 
the four voting devices.13 The models we estimate below use data from 128 voting stations 
for the national representative and state legislative election. Our dependent variable is the 
vote-share of ARI, FPV, PRO and Other parties in the election for national representative 
and state legislatures in each of the voting stations, where the category “Other parties” 
comprises all the remaining parties in both races.14 The independent variables included in 
                                                 
12 See footnote 4. 
13 Although the individual vote variable can be retrieved from each prototype’s logs, privacy 
considerations prevented us from linking the individual vote with the individual survey data.  Also, 
we dropped 924 observations with missing values from our analysis. Combining the information 
from the logs and the surveys, we have data from 128 out of the 139 total voting stations. 
14 “Other parties” includes 26 smaller parties in the election for National Representatives and 37 
parties in the election for the State Legislature. 
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the model are: Education, measured as the average years of schooling; the mean level of 
Political Information, summarized by the voters’ responses to three political knowledge 
questions; Interest in politics, coded on a three-point scale ranging from “not interested” (1) 
to “very interested” (3); the mean level of participants’ Use of Technology, estimated using 
factor analysis on a series of questions asking respondents about their use of cellular phones, 
personal computers and the internet; Evaluation of E-voting, a measure of voters’ 
assessment of the difficulty of electronic voting, coded on a five point scale ranging from 
‘very difficult’ (1)  to ‘very easy’ (5); and four variables measuring the percentage of 
participants who found their preferred party searching by Party Name, by Party Logo, by 
Party Number, or by Candidate Name.  All the independent variables are defined at the 
voting-station level; descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in Appendix II of 
this paper’s supplementary materials. 
In order to estimate the causal effect of different voting technologies on the expected 
support for the parties competing in the 2005 election, we used both regression models and 
matching methods. Specifically, we implemented two alternative hierarchical regression 
models for aggregate polytomous data that allow for extra variation relative to the baseline 
multinomial model and take into account the pilot project’s experimental design. In addition, 
we conducted a complementary non-parametric analysis, applying matching methods to 
estimate the causal effects of using alternative voting devices on the probability of support 
for each of the parties in the two elections under study. Although our analysis is based on 
experimental data, previous research shows that statistical corrections might be needed even 
in an experimental setup in order to achieve balance across the units of analysis and improve 
inferences regarding causal effects (Barnard et al., 2003; Imai and van Dyk, 2004; Imai, 
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2005). As mentioned before, this might be relevant for the Buenos Aires pilot project. In 
addition, this non-parametric approach imposes fewer assumptions, allowing us to assess the 
robustness of the main conclusions drawn from the regression models, which are heavily 
dependent on functional form assumptions such as linearity and additivity (Herron and 
Wand, 2007).  
The number of votes for the different parties in each voting station forms a vector of 
counts that can be analyzed using multinomial regression models of count data (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1998; McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). As it is known, however, aggregate vote 
data generally exhibits higher variability than the basic multinomial model can account for, 
and thus several alternative specifications have been proposed to deal with overdispersion 
(McCullagh and Nelder, 1989, p. 74), allowing for heterogeneity over units in the allocation 
of probabilities across categories and seeking to robustify inferences in the presence of 
outlying observations (Mebane and Sekhon, 2004; Congdon, 2005).  
In this paper, we fit and contrast two different hierarchical regression models: a multiple- 
logit model with a logistic normal distribution for the multinomial probabilities (Leonard 
and Hsu, 1994; Congdon, 2005) and a modified version of Katz and King’s (1999) additive 
logistic model for vote proportions. The multiple-logit model allows for a more flexible 
covariance structure than the conjugate multinomial-Dirichlet model for count data, it is 
more computationally feasible and it provides a more general hierarchical structure by using 
a multivariate normal distribution for the logits (Leonard and Hsu, 1994; Agresti and 
Hitchcock, 2005). The additive logistic model, on the other hand, transforms the parties’ 
vote-shares in each voting station into multivariate logits that are assumed to follow a 
multivariate Student-t distribution, attenuating the influence of outliers and also allowing the 
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covariances between votes for the parties to differ vis a vis the basic multinomial model; 
Katz and King’s (1999) approach has been shown to outperform similar models for vote 
proportions, such as Aitchison’s additive logistic normal model (1986), Tomz, Tucker and 
Wittenberg’s (2002) SUR model and Jackson’s (2002) heteroskedastic SUR model (Katz 
and King, 1999; Mebane and Sekhon, 2004). In both specifications, the probabilities of 
support for the parties are modeled as functions of the voting-station covariates described 
above. In addition, in order to account for the cluster sampling scheme used in the Buenos 
Aires experiment and to allow for unobserved heterogeneity across voting stations and for 
potential correlation in the election results across prototypes and precincts, we include zero-
mean random effects for the two non-nested factors (Congdon, 2005; Gelman and Hill, 
2007). In both models, we use “Other parties” as the baseline category.  
Letting ( )', , ,ARI FPV PRO OTHERi i i i iV V V V V=  and ( )', , ,ARI FPV PRO OTHERi i i i iVS VS VS VS VS=  denote 
the vector of votes for ARI, FPV, PRO and Other parties and the corresponding vector of  
vote-shares in voting station ,  1,... ,i i n=  defined by the intersection of precinct 
,   1,...,h h H=  and prototype ,  1,..., 4,p p =  the  two models considered are: 
 
a) Multiple-logit model:  
                                                 ( ),i i iV Multinomial N π∼                                                       (1) 
                                           exp( ) ,   =ARI, FPR, PRO
1 exp( )
j
j i
i j
i
j
jμπ μ= +∑                                    (2) 
                                           1
1 exp( )
Other
i j
i
j
π μ= +∑                                                                 (3)     
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                                     ,       , ,j j j ji i p hX j ARI FPV PROμ β λ η= + + =                                   (4) 
 
where ,  =ARI,FPV,PRO,Other,ki i
k
N V k=∑  ( ), , ,ARI FPV PRO Otheri i i i iπ π π π π= , iX  is a vector 
of predictors (including a constant term) defined at the voting station level, jβ  is a vector of 
fixed-effects, and ,p hλ η , are independent prototype- and precinct- random effects following 
multivariate normal distributions:   
 
 ( )', , 0, ,       1,..., 4,ARI FPV PROp p p p MVN pλλ λ λ λ⎡ ⎤= Σ =⎣ ⎦ ∼                     (5)                 
                                     ( ), , 0, ,        1,...,ARI FPV PROh h h h MVN h Hηη η η η⎡ ⎤= Σ =⎣ ⎦ ∼                    (6).      
 
b)  Additive logistic Student-t model:  
                                                      ( )~ , ,i iY MVT εμ υΣ                                                                          (7)                 
with 
  log ,  , ,
j
j i
i Other
i
VSY j ARI FPV PRO
VS
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
                                         (8) 
                                     ,     =ARI,FPV,PROj j j ji i p hX jμ β λ η= + +                                         (9)  
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and iX  
jβ , ,p hλ η  are defined as above. 15 Each party’s vote is then obtained using the 
additive-logistic transformations:  
                                   
exp 1,   , , ;     
1 exp 1 exp
j
ij OTHER
i i i ij j
i i
j j
Y
V N j ARI FPV PRO V N
Y Y
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦= × = = ×⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
    (10). 
 
Both models were fit by MCMC Gibbs sampling methods (Gelfland and Smith, 1990; 
Casella and George, 1992). The main advantage of using fully Bayesian estimation is that it 
allows obtaining arbitrarily precise approximations to the posterior densities, without relying 
on large-sample theory (Fahrmeier and Knorr-Held, 2000; Jackman, 2004). Additional 
details of the estimation are provided in Appendix III (Supplementary Materials).  
We used posterior predictive simulations (Iyengar and Dey, 2004; Gelman and Hill, 
2007) to compare the fit of both models. Specifically, we used two posterior predictive 
checks. First, we contrasted the ability of each of the models to replicate the overdispersion 
present in the data by computing  
 
                                                 
15 For those voting stations in which the vote-share of at least one of the four categories is zero, we 
use the “modified Aitchison technique” proposed by Fry, Fry and McLaren (1996). The main 
advantage of the “modified Aitchison technique” is that, unlike the Box -Cox transformation, it is 
invariant to the category used as baseline (Fry, Fry and McLaren, 1996).  
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                 ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( )
( )
k.Rep k.Obs
2 2
Rep k.Obsk.Rep
1 1
1
r
R I i i
Obs r
r i k ii
VAR V VAR V
P
R E VE V
χ χ
= =
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟> = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑∑                       (11) 
 
where, for the voting station defined by crossing precinct i  and prototype p  and for each 
party ,   , , ,k k ARI FPV PRO Other= , ( )k.Rep riV  is number of votes sampled from the 
predictive distribution ( )Rep Obs,i if V Vθ  of the model being considered, k.ObsiV  is the 
observed number of votes, and R  is the number of convergent Gibbs samples of the model’s 
parameters, θ . A satisfactory model will have ( )2 2Rep ObsP χ χ>  around 0.5 (Congdon, 2005).  
Also, following Iyengar and Dey (2004), a complementary comparison criteria based on 
the discrepancy between observed and simulated data would favor the model that minimizes 
the predictive loss ( ) ( )2Rep Rep, Obs Obs Obsd VS VS E VS VS VS= − ,  where again RepVS  and 
ObsVS  are vectors of replicated and observed vote-shares. Using the Gibbs samples of each 
model’s parameters, d  can be estimated as:  
 
                                                ( ) 2Rep
1 1
1 R I rObs
i i
r i
d VS VS
R = =
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑                                      (12) 
for the two models under consideration. 
In addition, we performed a complementary analysis using Genetic Matching (Diamond 
and Sekhon; 2005; Sekhon 2007), which is a nonparametric method for performing 
multivariate matching based on an algorithm proposed by Mebane and Sekhon (1998). 
Genetic Matching has been shown to have better properties than the usual alternative 
 24
matching methods, such as Mahalanobis distance and propensity score matching (Diamond 
and Sekhon, 2005; Sekhon, 2007).    
In this application, we conducted a series of pairwise matching exercises (Ho et al., 2007; 
Herron and Wand, 2007), where each exercise considered the average causal effect on each 
party’s vote-share of using Prototype r  versus Prototype s , with , 1,.., 4,   r ,r s s= <  and   
voting stations using Prototype r  taken to be the “treated” group. Using one-to-one 
matching with replacement, we found sets of matched pairs based on the socio-demographic 
covariates included in ,X  where each pair contains one voting station using Prototype r  
and one using Prototype s .16 The average causal effects for each party 
,k , , , ,k ARI FPV PRO OTHER=  were estimated as the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT): 
        
       ( ) ( ){ }| , Prototype | ,Prototype | Prototypek ki i i i i i iE E VS X r E VS X s r= − = = ,            (13) 
 
with confidence intervals were computed based on Abadie-Imbens’ (2006) standard errors, 
which account for the asymptotic variance induced by the matching procedure itself.17 
Appendix IV (Supplementary Materials) discusses additional details of the matching 
                                                 
16 See Mebane and Sekhon (1998), Diamond and Sekhon (2005) and Sekhon (2007) for details on 
the distance measure and the evolutionary algorithm used to minimize the maximum discrepancy 
between the matched treated and control covariates in the context of Genetic Matching. 
17 This matching analysis was implemented using “Matching”, a package for R developed by 
Mebane and Sekhon (2008).  
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analysis and reports the p-values of the two-sample and paired t-tests before and after 
matching.  
 
6. Results 
Tables 4 and 5 report the posterior means and standard deviations of the fixed effects 
parameters in the multiple-logit and additive logistic Student-t models for both races. The 
multiple-logit model exhibits a better fit: the posterior predictive loss d  is smaller than for 
the compositional model, and it satisfactorily replicates the overdispersion present in the 
data, with values of ( )2 2Rep ObsP χ χ>  close to 0.5 for the two elections under study.  The 
additive logistic Student-t model, on the other hand, generates predictions that are 
overdispersed relative to the observations.  
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Table 4 
Estimated posterior means and standard deviations for the fixed effects*  
Election of National Representatives 
Multiple–logit model Additive logistic Student-t model 
Parameter 
ARI  FPV  PRO  ARI  FPV  PRO  
Education 
0.10  
(0.14) 
-0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.29**  
(0.12) 
0.11  
(0.11) 
-0.21*  
(0.11) 
0.37***   
(0.13) 
Political 
information 
0.54* 
(0.32) 
0.27  
(0.33) 
-0.36 
(0.34) 
0.48  
(0.35) 
-0.21  
(0.39) 
-0.06   
(0.42) 
Interest in Politics 
-0.15 
(0.19) 
0.41*  
(0.21) 
0.24   
(0.20) 
-0.29  
(0.22) 
0.39*  
(0.23) 
0.14   
(0.25) 
Use of 
Technology 
0.05  
(0.16) 
0.10 
(0.17) 
0.25 
(0.17) 
-0.16  
(0.19) 
0.04  
(0.20) 
-0.13  
(0.19) 
Assessment of E-
voting 
0.19  
(0.43) 
0.34 
(0.35) 
0.19 
(0.36) 
0.23  
(0.40) 
0.08  
(0.43) 
0.34  
 (0.43) 
Search by Party 
Name 
-0.54**  
(0.26) 
-0.18 
(0.28) 
-0.44*   
(0.26) 
-0.81**  
(0.29) 
-0.10  
(0.33) 
-0.63**   
(0.33) 
Search by Party 
Logo 
0.01  
(0.31) 
0.02  
(0.34) 
0.24 
(0.33) 
-0.31  
(0.40) 
0.08  
(0.42) 
-0.30   
(0.44) 
Search by Party 
Number 
-0.06 
(0.32) 
0.77**  
(0.35) 
0.43 
(0.34) 
-0.44  
(0.39) 
0.87**  
(0.44) 
0.06   
(0.42) 
Search by 
Candidate Name 
-0.39  
(0.25) 
-0.06  
(0.25) 
-0.73*** 
(0.27) 
0.09  
(0.30) 
-0.20  
(0.33) 
0.26   
(0.31) 
Intercept -1.13  -1.03  -2.73**   -0.78  -0.44  -3.29***   
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(1.44) (0.68) (1.09) (0.97) (1.01) (1.22) 
( )2 2Rep ObsP χ χ>   0.42 1.00 
 d  2.84 5.69 
     * Significance levels: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1. 
 
Table 5 
Estimated posterior means and standard deviations for the fixed effects*  
Election of State Legislators 
Multiple–logit model Additive logistic Student-t model 
Parameter 
ARI  FPV  PRO  ARI  FPV  PRO  
Education 
0.14  
(0.10)  
-0.23**  
(0.11) 
0.29*   
(0.15) 
0.18*  
(0.10) 
-0.29**  
(0.12) 
0.37***   
(0.13) 
Political 
information 
0.70** 
(0.30) 
-0.01  
(0.33) 
-0.09   
(0.33) 
0.49  
(0.32) 
0.13  
(0.43) 
0.07   
(0.39) 
Interest in Politics 
-0.09  
(0.19) 
0.44*  
(0.22)  
0.51***   
(0.19) 
-0.22  
(0.24) 
0.49  
(0.29) 
0.50* 
(0.28) 
Use of 
Technology 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.33*  
(0.18) 
0.22   
(0.16) 
-0.10  
(0.17) 
0.28  
(0.24) 
0.06   
(0.20) 
Assessment of E-
voting 
0.36  
(0.40) 
0.05  
(0.50) 
-0.16   
(0.37) 
0.27  
(0.39) 
0.01  
(0.50) 
0.27  
(0.41) 
Search by Party 
Name 
-0.11  
(0.27) 
-0.59**  
(0.31) 
-0.29   
(0.27) 
-0.56  
(0.30) 
-0.41  
(0.36) 
-0.51   
(0.35) 
Search by Party -0.05  0.18  0.45   -0.45  0.29  -0.10   
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Logo (0.32) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.47) (0.41) 
Search by Party 
Number 
-0.21  
(0.33) 
0.52  
(0.39) 
0.12   
(0.33) 
-0.26  
(0.39) 
0.81  
(0.48) 
-0.08   
(0.41) 
Search by 
Candidate Name 
-0.07  
(0.24) 
0.05  
(0.28) 
-0.47*   
(0.27) 
-0.01  
(0.26) 
-0.27  
(0.32) 
-0.44  
(0.31) 
Intercept 
-2.48**  
(1.05)   
-0.77  
(1.15) 
-3.44**   
(1.31) 
-1.97*  
(1.04) 
-0.54  
(1.16) 
-4.35***   
(1.15) 
( )2 2Rep ObsP χ χ>   0.57  1.00  
d   3.02 6.78 
      * Significance levels: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1. 
 
For both model specifications, the results in Tables 4 and 5 reveal some interesting 
differences regarding the effect of several covariates on the support for the three largest 
parties. For instance, in the two elections considered, the votes for Propuesta Republicana 
(PRO) increased in voting stations with higher average levels of education, while they 
decreased for Frente para la Victoria (FPV). In contrast, higher average levels of political 
interest were associated with higher support for FPV. This result is consistent with prior 
research that emphasizes class and education effects among non-Peronist voters (Mora y 
Araujo & Llorente, 1980; Calvo & Murillo, 2004). Interestingly, the percentage of 
respondents interested in politics was also related to the support for PRO in the election for 
state representatives under both models. Also, the multiple-logit model indicates that the 
average level of political information was positively related to the vote support for Alianza 
Republicana Independiente (ARI), but not for the other two large parties. Participants’ 
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assessments regarding the degree of difficulty posed by the electronic voting procedure had 
no systematic effect in the linear predictors ,  , , .j j ARI FPV PROμ =   
Regarding the effect of the different information cues used by participants when casting 
their vote, both models show that the support for FPV in the more visible race increased 
with the percentage of voters relying on the official party number. The votes for ARI and 
PRO, on the other hand, were negatively related to the percentage of participants using the 
name of the party in the election for national representatives, while in the multiple-logit 
specification there is also a negative relationship between Search by Party Name and FPVμ  
in the less visible election. In the case of the multiple-logit model, PROμ  was also negatively 
associated to the percentage of voters basing their choice on the first candidate’s name in 
both congressional elections; this relationship is not statistically significant at the usual 
confidence levels for the additive logistic specification. Remarkably, although more than a 
quarter of the participants in the experiment reported having used the logo information as a 
voting cue (Table 2), neither of the two models indicates a systematic effect of Search by 
Party Logo on the support for the competing parties in either of the two elections. 
 The main focus of our analysis, however, lies in the effect of the different voting 
technologies on the support for the competing parties across elections. Figures 2 and 3 
present the estimates and confidence intervals of the centered prototype random-effects for 
the two hierarchical models, computed as i
4
1
1 ,    , ,
4
j j j
p p p
p
j ARI FPV PROλ λ λ
=
= − =∑ . This 
gives us more precise inferences about the relative values of the prototype coefficients and 
the impact on the support for the three largest parties (Gelman and Hill, 2007).    
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Figure 2 
Centered Prototype random coefficients i jpλ  for both hierarchical models  
 Election of National Representatives 
 
 
Note: The center dots correspond to the posterior means of i ,   , ,jp j ARI FPV PROλ = , the   
thicker lines to the 50% confidence interval, and the thinner lines to the 90% confidence interval. 
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Figure 3 
Centered Prototype random coefficients i jpλ  for both hierarchical models  
 Election of State Legislators 
 
Note: The center dots correspond to the posterior means of i ,   , ,jp j ARI FPV PROλ = , the   
thicker lines to the 50% confidence interval, and the thinner lines to the 90% confidence interval. 
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The evidence presented in these figures indicates that different voting devices have 
potential influences on electoral outcomes, even after controlling for socio-demographic and 
behavioral variables. For both model specifications, the effect of the voting technologies and 
the associated ballot designs vary considerably across parties and, to a certain extent, across 
races. Moreover, the main substantive conclusions resulting from Figures 2 and 3 are 
essentially the same for the multiple-logit and additive logistic models, suggesting that the 
results are robust to alternative specifications and modeling strategies. For instance, while 
the Optical Scan device with separate ballots (Prototype 3) had a significantly negative 
effect on the votes for FPV and PRO in both congressional elections, the touch-screen DRE 
device (Prototype 2) had the opposite effect, raising the support for FPV and PRO in the 
election for national representatives, although not in the election for state legislators. As 
mentioned above, the name of the first candidate of each party figured prominently in the 
screen of Prototype 2, and more than half of the participants using this device cast their vote 
based on this information. Hence, a possible interpretation of this result is that, while the 
first candidates of the FPV and PRO, Rafael Bielsa and Mauricio Macri, were renowned 
figures who were easily identifiable by voters, participants generally did not recognize the 
candidates running for the local legislature of any of the competing parties (Calvo, Escolar 
and Pomares, 2007), and thus the relative advantage obtained by the FPV and PRO in the 
more salient election disappeared in the less visible race. Nonetheless, it is interesting to 
note that, as seen in Tables 5 and 6, neither of the models indicates a systematic effect of the 
percentage of respondents using the first candidate’s name on the linear predictor for FPV in 
either of the races, while the multiple-logit model even points to a negative relationship 
between Search by Candidate Name and PROμ  in the two congressional races. More 
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generally, the effect of Prototype 2 on the vote support for FPV and PRO is positive and 
statistically significant even after controlling for the effect of the different voting cues used 
by participants and their evaluation of the difficulty of electronic voting. This indicates that 
the prototype-effects might be capturing additional sources of variability in the dependent 
variables, beyond that explained by the aggregate survey data. On the other hand, there is no 
evidence of systematic advantages induced by Prototype 1 in favor of any of the competing 
parties, while, in the case of Prototype 4, i 4λ  is statistically significant only for Propuesta 
Republicana under the multiple-logit model, and just in the election for state legislators. 
Also, in contrast to our findings for FPV and PRO, the results in Figures 2 and 3 indicate the 
support for the other large party, ARI, was not significantly related to any of the four 
prototypes tested in the experiment at the usual confidence levels.  
Table 6 complements the information presented in Figures 2 and 3, reporting the mean 
posterior and 90% confidence intervals of the pairwise differences in the average 
probabilities ,  , , , ,k k ARI FPV PRO OTHERπ =  across prototypes. Given the better fit of the 
hierarchical multiple-logit specification, we use the Gibbs samples of the parameters in this 
model in order to compute the causal effects of the different voting technologies on kπ  via 
average predictive comparisons (Gelman and Hill, 2007). The main substantive findings are 
similar for the additive logistic model.  
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Table 6 
Pairwise differences in the probability of support for each party across prototypesa 
(in percentage points) 
 Pairwise 
comparisons 
ARIπ  FPVπ  PROπ  OTHERπ  
      
Prototypes 1-2 2.1 
(-4.2, 8.7) 
-3.6 
(-8.4, 1.0) 
-5.2 
(-10.9, 0.4) 
6.6 
(0.8, 12.4) 
Prototypes 1-3 3.4 
(-3.2, 9.9) 
0.2 
(-4.0, 4.4) 
1.2 
(-4.6, 2.1) 
-4.8 
(-10.8, 1.7) 
Prototypes 1-4 2.9 
(-0.4, 6.0) 
-1.0 
(-4.3, 1.9) 
-2.4 
(-6.0, 1.0) 
0.5 
(-3.6, 4.3) 
Prototypes 2-3 1.3 
(-0.5, 3.3) 
3.8 
(2.1, 5.7) 
6.3 
(4.4, 8.3) 
-11.0 
(-13.7, -9.2) 
Prototypes 2-4 0.7 
(-6.9, 8.0) 
2.6 
(-3.3, 8.3) 
2.7 
(-4.2, 9.4) 
-6.1 
(-13.0, 1.0) 
Election of 
National 
Representatives 
Prototypes 3-4 -0.5 
(-7.7, 6.5) 
-1.2 
(-6.3, 4.9) 
-3.6 
(-9.8, 2.4) 
5.3 
(-2.1, 13.4)  
      
Prototypes 1-2 -0.6 
(-5.4, 5.1) 
-0.55 
(-5.5, 4.6) 
1.5 
(-4.2, 6.9) 
-0.4 
(-7.7, 6.5) 
Prototypes 1-3 -0.2 
(-5.3, 5.2) 
2.7 
(-1.5, 7.4) 
5.3 
(-0.1, 10.4) 
-7.8 
(-15.1, -0.8) 
Prototypes 1-4 2.5 
(-0.49, 5.35) 
-1.7 
(-5.0, 1.4) 
-4.0 
(-7.8, -0.3) 
3.1 
(-0.9, 7.2) 
Prototypes 2-3 0.4 
(-1.4, 2.2) 
3.3 
(1.8, 4.9)  
3.8 
(1.9, 5.7) 
-7.5 
(-9.8, -5.1) 
Prototypes 2-4 3.1 
(-2.8, 8.7) 
-1.1 
(-7.8, 5.2) 
-5.5 
(-12.2, 1.5) 
3.5 
(-4.6, 12.3) 
Election of 
State 
Legislators 
Prototypes 3-4 2.7 
(-3.0, 8.0) 
-4.4 
(-10.6, 1.1) 
-9.3 
(-15.6, -3.1) 
11.0 
(2.8, 19.5) 
 a 90% confidence intervals are reported in parenthesis 
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Others things equal, the support for the largest parties tends to be higher for the two DRE 
devices than for Prototype 3, although the differences between Prototype 1 and 3 are not 
statistically significant at the usual confidence levels. In contrast, in the cases of FPV and 
PRO, there are significant differences between their support for Prototypes 2 and 3: the 
touch-screen DRE device leads to an increase of 3.8 and 6.3 percentage points in the their 
vote-shares, respectively, in the election for national representatives, and of 2.7 and 5.3 
percentage points in the election for state legislators; these difference are significant at the 
0.01 level. While, as evidenced in Figures 2 and 3, these differences stem both from an 
increase in the support for FPV and PRO induced by Prototype 2 in the more visible race 
and a reduction of their support for Prototype 3, the results in the election for state 
legislators are entirely driven by the higher vote-share of the smaller parties included in the 
category “Other” under the OS device with separate ballots. In fact, the relative support for 
the smaller parties tends to be consistently higher with Prototype 3 in both races: in the 
national representative election, the vote-share of the minor parties is 11 percentage points 
higher under Prototype 3 vis a vis Prototype 2, while in the state legislature election their 
vote-share with this prototype is systematically higher when compared against all the other 
voting devices.  Also, note that in the national representative election, the relative support 
for the smaller parties is lower with Prototype 2 than Prototype 1. Hence, in the more visible 
race, the touch-screen DRE device consistently favors the parties with more renowned 
candidates, to the detriment of the smaller ones. This result is consistent with Calvo, Escolar 
and Pomares (2007), in the sense that voters’ electoral choices are affected by the cues and 
the information demands from the different e-vote technologies.  
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In order to assess the robustness of these results, Figures 4 and 5 plot the average 
treatment effects on the vote-share of each of the parties and the 50% and 90% confidence 
intervals obtained from pairwise comparisons across prototypes using genetic matching 
(Diamond and Sekhon, 2005; Sekhon, 2007). While the point estimates obtained from this 
non-parametric analysis do not necessarily coincide with those reported in Table 6, the 
general conclusions are in line with those drawn from the two regression models: in both 
elections, the vote-share of the smaller parties increases under Prototype 3 when compared 
against the two DRE devices, and the average effect is larger in the more visible race. The 
opposite occurs for the three more established parties, those with more campaign spending 
and higher name recognition; again, Prototype 2 tends to increase the vote-share of the two 
parties with more visible candidates, FPV and PRO, especially vis a vis Prototype 3 in the 
national representative election.  
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Figure 4 
Average causal effect on each party’s vote-share across prototypes 
Election of National Representatives  
 
Note: The center dots correspond to the estimated average causal effect on the probability of 
supporting each of the parties comparing prototypes r and s , , 1,.., 4,   .r s r s= <  The thinner 
lines correspond to the 90% confidence intervals, and the thicker lines to the 50% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 5 
Average causal effect on each party’s vote-share across prototypes 
Election of State Legislators  
 
Note: The center dots correspond to the estimated average causal effect on the probability of 
supporting each of the parties comparing prototypes r and s , , 1,.., 4,   .r s r s= <  The thinner 
lines correspond to the 90% confidence intervals, and the thicker lines to the 50% confidence 
intervals. 
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The results presented above provide strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
alternative voting technologies may have substantive influence on the electoral support for 
the different parties competing in future elections using the types of voting technologies 
tested in the Buenos Aires pilot. The relevant question thus becomes: how would the 
election outcomes vary under different voting technologies? In order to answer this question, 
we estimate the expected electoral outcome assuming only one prototype had been used in 
each voting-station, while holding all the remaining variables constant. Based on the 
posterior Gibbs samples from the hierarchical multiple-logit model, Table 7 reports the 
aggregate election outcomes in both races for each of the four prototypes and compares 
them to the actual results in all the voting-stations used in the experiment.  
The results indicate that different voting technologies would in fact have led to quite 
different election outcomes. For instance, if Prototype 1 had been used in all voting-stations, 
Alianza para una Republica de Iguales (ARI) would have had the highest expected number 
of votes in the race for the election for national representatives, rather than the actual 
winner, Propuesta Republicana (PRO). ARI would have had the highest expected vote-share 
in the election for state legislators under Prototype 3. In contrast, the vote-shares of PRO 
and FPV in the national election would have been maximized under Prototype 2, increasing 
their support at the expense of ARI and, especially, of the smallest parties; in the less visible 
election, however, in which voters could generally not recognize the candidates’ names, the 
advantage enjoyed by PRO and FPV under the touch-screen DRE device would have 
virtually vanished. Finally, the expected vote-share of the minor parties in both races would 
have increased substantially under Prototype 3, obtaining almost 46% of the support in the 
national representative election and 55.0% in the state legislative contest, against 40.2% and 
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49.2% in the actual experiment, respectively. Hence, the choice among different voting 
technologies could have had substantive implications in terms of the election results in both 
congressional races. 
   
Table 7 
Expected versus actual election outcomes for all the voting-stations  
Vote-shares, in percentage points 
 
ARI FPV PRO 
Other 
Parties 
Election of N. Representatives     
Prototype 1 22.77 14.52 21.59 41.12 
Prototype 2 20.64 18.13 26.74 34.49 
Prototype 3 19.36 14.33 20.40 45.91 
Prototype 4 19.89 15.52 23.99 40.60 
Actual results 21.03 15.58 23.16 40.24 
Election of S. Legislators     
Prototype 1 18.00 12.97 21.87 47.16 
Prototype 2 18.57 13.52 20.38 47.53 
Prototype 3 18.16 10.25 16.59 55.00 
Prototype 4 15.47 14.64 25.84 44.05 
Actual results 18.04 12.31 20.43 49.22 
 
 41
7. Conclusion 
Multi-party races impose substantial demands on voters, who have to gather enough 
information to be able to distinguish between the positions of the different parties before the 
elections and to identify their preferred choice at the polls. In this paper, we present the first 
study on the potential impact of different voting technologies on election outcomes in multi-
party races, analyzing data from a large-scale pilot in Buenos Aires using a combination of 
parametric and non-parametric methods.  
Our findings indicate that different voting devices could have considerable influence on 
the relative support for different parties across races, even after controlling for relevant 
socio-demographic and behavioral predictors. In particular, we show that amount and the 
form in which information is presented to voters might influence their propensity to choose 
some parties over other, and this effect may be large enough to actually affect the election 
results. These substantive results are similar for the different empirical methods used in the 
analysis, strengthening the validity of our conclusions and marking an important difference 
with relevant studies on this topic examining U.S. elections, most of which have found that 
of impact of alternative voting technologies on election outcomes are quite small (Card and 
Moretti, 2007; Herron and Wand, 2007; Herron, Mebane and Wand, 2008). In this sense, 
our results are in line with the findings of Reynolds and Steenbergen (2006), who concluded 
that some aspects of the ballot design, such as symbols, photographs, layout, and color, play 
a crucial role as political cues and may have a considerable influence on voting behavior, 
particularly in multi-party elections.   
The evidence presented in this paper is particularly significant in view of the increasing 
trend towards electronic voting and the growing number of countries moving from 
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traditional paper ballots to electronic voting systems (Milkota, 2002, E-Voting.CC, 2008). In 
many of these countries, political parties have repeatedly expressed concerns about the 
possibility of being systematically disadvantaged by the new voting technologies.18 Our 
results suggest that this might actually be the case, rather than just a myth fuelled by 
politicians, and raise the possibility that some voting technologies may in fact shape the 
electoral outcomes, rather than merely recording voters’ preferred choices. In addition, the 
evidence presented here underscores the importance of comparing not only electronic voting 
vis a vis hand-counted ballots, but also different types of voting technologies. While this 
might be quite apparent in the U.S., given the wide variety of voting systems used, it is 
definitely not the case in other regions (Europe, Latin America), where the debate in many 
countries switching to electronic voting systems has focused on the differences between the 
traditional paper ballots and the “voting machines”.  
 
                                                 
18 For instance, several French political parties expressed such concerns during the 2007 Presidential 
election, the first time electronic voting machines were used for a presidential election in the country 
(Le Figaro, 04/18/2007). 
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party electoral outcomes: the case of Buenos Aires’ 2005 Congressional Election 
 
Appendix I - Characteristics of the four e-voting prototypes 
Table S. 1   
 How to cast a vote Information on the candidates 
Prototype 1: 
DRE, Keypad 
The voter inserts the smart card 
to initiate the voting process. 
Using a numeric keypad, she 
over party labels and selects a 
party list for each race. 
Party name, number and logo 
displayed on the screen. Entering the 
party number displays the list of 
candidates. Labels for National 
Representatives and State Legislators 
displayed in two and three screens, 
respectively. 
Prototype 2: 
DRE, 
 Touch-screen 
The voter inserts the smart card 
to initiate the voting process. 
Using a touch-screen device, she 
scrolls over party labels and 
selects a party list for each race 
Party name, number, logo and first 
candidate of the list displayed on the 
screen. Selecting the party label 
displays the remaining candidates. 
Labels for National Representatives 
and State Legislators displayed in three 
and four screens, respectively. 
Prototype 3:  
OS, Two ballots 
The voter is asked to insert a 
paper ballot or press the 
CONTINUE button to cast a 
blank vote. Separate paper ballots 
for each party and for each race. 
All information displayed on the 
ballot: party name, number, logo, and 
complete list of candidates. 
Prototype 4 
OS, Single ballot 
T he voter browses the party lists 
in a booklet and marks her 
preferences on the paper ballot. 
An optical device scans the 
ballot. Order of lists based on 
Party number. 
Only the party name and number are 
displayed on the ballot. Complete 
information on the party and 
candidates is in a separate booklet. 
Figure S.1 – The four e-voting devices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix II – Summary descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
included in the hierarchical models  
 
Table S. 2   
Mean value of the regressors, by prototype and for the whole sample  
Variable Prototype 1 
Prototype 
2 
Prototype 
3 
Prototype 
4 
Whole 
sample Range 
Education 6.7 6.7 6.6 7.0 6.7  
Political 
information 1.96 1.90 1.91 1.94 1.92 0 - 3 
Interest in politics 2.12 2.12 2.15 2.04 2.12 1 - 3 
Assessment of E-
voting 4.15 4.19 4.05 4.07 4.13 1 – 5 
Cell-phone owners 75.31 73.14 73.54 74.07 73.93 0 - 100 
Personal-computer 
owners 79.49 76.10 78.25 82.95 78.45 0 - 100 
Internet users 80.32 79.97 78.55 82.54 79.83 0 - 100 
Use of Technology 0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.06 0.00  
Search by Party 
Name 51.4 51.0 44.3 53.4 49.4 0 - 100 
Search by Party 
Logo 51.4 51.0 44.3 53.4 49.4 0 - 100 
Search by Party 
Number 27.3 30.3 22.4 7.4 25.8 0 - 100 
Search by 
Candidate Name 33.3 50.1 47.1 45.0 44.2 0 - 100 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Appendix III - Estimation of the hierarchical models used in the analysis   
Adopting non-informative conjugate priors for the fixed-effects and precision 
matrices:  
                               ( )2, ,  , , ,  l 1,...jl N j ARI FPV PRO Lβ ββ δ σ = =∼                        (S.1) 
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and assuming conditional independence throughout, the joint posterior densities of the 
unknown parameters in the multiple-logit and additive logistic models presented in 
Section 5 are given by:  
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Inference on the parameters of interest can be performed by Markov chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) simulations using Gibbs sampling to repeatedly draw samples from each 
unknown parameter’s full conditional posterior distribution (Gelfland and Smith, 1990; 
Casella and George, 1992).1  Under mild regularity conditions (Geman and Geman, 1984; 
Gilks, Richardson and Spiegelhalter, 1996), for a sufficiently large number of iterations, 
samples from these complete conditionals approach samples from the marginals used for 
Bayesian inference. The means and standard deviation of the convergent samples can 
used to summarize the posterior distributions of the model's coefficients and to compute 
the marginal effects of the different e-voting devices on each party’s vote-share (using 
the corresponding transformations in the case of the additive logistic model; Katz and 
King, 1999; Bhaumik, Dey and Ravishanker, 2003). 
                                                 
15 In the case of (S.4), while the conditional posterior densities have no closed forms, draws of the 
unknown parameters can be obtained using Adaptative Rejection Sampling (Gilks and Wild, 
1992). 
The two models were fit in WinBUGS 1.4, as called from R 2.4.1.2 For both 
specifications, the fixed effects jkβ , were assigned 2(0,100 )N  priors, while a 
( )3, 4Wishart I  prior was used for the precision matrices of the random effects 1u−Σ  and 
1
v
−Σ .  In the case of the additive logistic Student-t model, the precision matrix of the 
voting-station errors was assigned a ( )3, 4Wishart I  prior, while a ( )2,100Uniform  
distribution was used for the degrees of freedom parameter υ .  Routine sensitivity 
analyses were performed in order to examine the effect of the priors on the model fit, and 
alternative values for the hypeparameters were tried, yielding similar results.  
Three parallel chains with dispersed initial values reached approximate convergence 
after 85,000 iterations, with a burn-in of 3,500 iterations; the results reported in Section 5 
are based on 1,000 samples of the pooled chains of deviates.3 The means and standard 
deviation of the convergent Gibbs samples were used to summarize the posterior 
distributions of the model's coefficients and to compute the effects of the different e-
voting technologies on each party’s support. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The code is available from the authors upon request. 
3 Approximate convergence is achieved for values of Gelman and Rubin’s (1992) estimated 
Potential Scale Reduction factor below 1.1.  
Appendix IV - Balance Tests Before and After Matching 
As mentioned in the text, we also performed a series of matching exercises using Genetic 
Matching (Diamond and Sekhon; 2005; Sekhon 2007a), where each exercise considered 
the average causal effect on each party’s vote-share of using Prototype r  versus 
Prototype s , with , 1,.., 4,   r ,r s s= <  and voting stations using Prototype r  taken to be 
the “treated” group. The criterion for determining whether sets of voting stations have 
been matched is based on whether the means of observable pre-treatment variables are 
indistinguishable between the two groups being tested. Table S.3 presents the set of 
matching covariates and reports the p-values of two-sample and paired t-tests of the 
hypothesis of no difference between the means of these variables before and after 
matching. Including additional socio-demographic covariates or higher-order terms yields 
essentially identical results. 
As seen in the Table, for most of these variables, the difference in means tests were 
statistically insignificant at the usual confidence levels before matching. Nonetheless, 
Genetic Matching minimizes the maximum discrepancy between the matched treated and 
control covariates. In the few cases in the two-sample t-tests were significant, the pairs of 
matched subsamples are indistinguishable in their means. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that large values for these p-values do not guarantee that the level of level of 
balance achieved is sufficient for reliable inferences about the effects of the prototypes on 
parties’ vote-shares (Diamond and Sekhon, 2005; Sekhon, 2007b).  
 
 
 
Table S. 3: p-values of the two-sample and paired t-tests  
Two-sample t-tests 
before matching 
Paired t-tests 
After matching Variable 
1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 
Education 0.86 0.90 0.12 0.94 0.17 0.14 0.60 0.93 0.20 0.83 0.68 0.19 
Education2 0.83 0.91 0.22 0.91 0.16 0.14 0.65 0.76 0.30 0.96 0.64 0.17 
Political 
information 
0.87 0.68 0.92 0.52 0.84 0.87 0.68 0.82 0.40 0.98 0.96 0.99 
Interest in 
politics 
0.48 0.60 0.18 0.34 0.15 0.10 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.33 0.12 0.12 
Use of 
Technology 
0.29 0.83 0.38 0.33 0.08 0.27 0.57 0.93 0.82 0.85 0.39 0.97 
Education * 
Political 
information 
0.97 0.65 0.64 0.39 0.62 0.86 0.64 0.73 0.20 0.98 0.74 0.89 
Education * 
Use of 
Technology 
0.51 0.94 0.79 0.53 0.07 0.15 0.68 0.82 0.78 0.99 0.57 0.15
             
Number of 
observations 
            
Treated 38 38 38 38 38 36 38 38 38 38 38 36 
Control 38 36 13 36 13 13 38 38 38 38 38 36 
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